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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Office of Congressional Affairs

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SUBJECT: Outline of DCI Testimony
on INF Treaty

The attached document is a draft outline for the DCI's testimony before the SSCI, scheduled for 18 February.

The SSCI staff, particularly George Tenet, Gary Sojka and John Despres, indicated an interest in receiving the outline during a meeting with Agency officers on 20 January.

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Outline for Draft INF Testimony

Theme Statement: To assess prospects for Soviet compliance, must look at INF in context of Gorbachev's entire program. In this context, we can make the judgment that the political, economic and military incentives to comply appear to outweigh the incentives not to do so. This judgment is based on our understanding of Gorbachev's goals and the place his arms control agenda has in achieving those goals, as well as specific political and military gains to be derived from the INF treaty.

I. Gorbachev's longterm goals

A. Gorbachev has undertaken a bold effort to achieve the social and economic revitalization of the USSR, which he has characterized as in a "precrisis stage." The personal stakes are high for Gorbachev, whose tenure in office probably depends upon the extent to which his policies begin to show prospects for success in the face of skepticism by more conservative Politburo members, lower levels of the bureaucracy whose interests are threatened by reform, and the deep skepticism of the working masses.

B. The key to Gorbachev's program is industrial modernization.

1. Following a period of debate and experimentation, the Soviet government in late June 1987 adopted a set of documents mandating the most comprehensive reform of economic management since the introduction of Stalinist central planning in the late 1920s.

2. Before approving the program, the collective leadership almost certainly had to be convinced that the modernization of civil industry ultimately would benefit defense industries and the military.

C. Gorbachev's industrial modernization goals probably make it necessary to constrain growth in military spending.

1. Efforts to rationalize such constraints currently are visible in changes in Soviet military doctrine, including development of the "sufficiency" concept.

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2. Personnel changes within the military, particularly the naming of General Yazov as Defense Minister, also appear motivated in part by Gorbachev's determination to assure a military leadership receptive to his policies.

3. To ensure approval by the collective leadership of constraints on military spending, however, Gorbachev must limit the potential threat to Soviet security posed by US strategic modernization and, in particular, SDI, with its potential to disrupt economic and military planning.

II. As a principal means of pursuing his goals, Gorbachev has developed an active and comprehensive arms control agenda, through which he hopes to buy time to implement his domestic economic program.

III. Political and military objectives of the INF treaty

A. The Soviets appear to see a number of political benefits from the INF treaty.

1. The Soviets regard the INF accord as a means of building momentum toward further, more far-reaching agreements and obtaining a stamp of legitimacy for the arms control process from a conservative US administration.

2. The Soviets crafted their policy on INF in such a way as to improve their image among Europeans by making Moscow appear less dependent upon military intimidation as an instrument of policy. (Some Soviets have criticized the original SS-20 deployment decision for fostering such an image.)

3. Other hoped-for political gains from Soviet INF policy include reviving European doubts about US willingness to risk nuclear war to defend its allies' territory; increasing pressure on Allied governments to limit theater nuclear arms by heightening West German concern over becoming the only nuclear battlefield in Europe; sparking public sentiment in the UK and France against a further buildup of their strategic nuclear forces to help maintain the momentum toward arms control; and advancing Soviet efforts to improve relations with Far Eastern countries by removing the threat of Soviet INF forces from that region.

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B. The military impact of the INF accord also serves Gorbachev's objectives by reducing the threat that Soviet forces must counter.

1. By removing US Pershing IIs and GLCMs, the INF treaty accomplishes what the Soviets failed to achieve in the early 1980s by supporting the European peace movement, walking out of the INF and START talks, and threatening an analogous response to the NATO deployments.

2. The Soviets appear to have been particularly concerned about the Pershing II, with its short flight time, high accuracy, and ability to reach Moscow. They probably believed it greatly increased the vulnerability of critical strategic force and command assets in the Western USSR, degraded Soviet ability to launch on tactical warning, and allowed the United States to strike the Soviet homeland at will without committing central-strategic systems.

IV. Effect of the INF treaty on Soviet targetting requirements, and inducements to cheat.

A. Soviet calculus under an INF-only regime

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B. Impact of a START treaty

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C. More broadly, any Soviet decision to cheat under an INF-only or an INF/START regime would have to take into account not only the effects on the military balance between the two sides, but the possible implications for Gorbachev's longterm objectives outlined above.

1. The Soviets would have to weigh the potential military advantages of cheating against the impact detection would have on their effort to constrain strategic competition with the United States through arms control.

2. This reasoning suggests that advocates of compliance would include at a minimum Gorbachev, his closest political supporters, and those leaders with a strong interest in economic revitalization. While there has been some reporting of discontent among elements of the military with Gorbachev's INF moves, Chief of the General Staff Akhromeyev has been a forceful advocate of Soviet arms control policy and the military has accepted verification measures under the INF treaty that would complicate efforts to cheat on its provisions. Moreover, it is likely that top military leaders like Akhromeyev recognize that without economic revitalization Soviet security cannot be guaranteed in the future.

3. It therefore would appear that so long as Gorbachev's policies are in effect, the consensus among the

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leadership would favor complying with the INF treaty rather than taking the risk of being caught cheating for the sake of a marginal military advantage.

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